The question of question to-day
is the Khilafat question, otherwise known as that of the Turkish peace terms.
His Excellency the Viceroy deserves our thanks for receiving the joint
deputation even at this late hour, especially when he was busy preparing to
receive the head of the different provinces. His Excellency must be thanked for
the unfailing courtesy with which he received the deputation and the courteous
language in which his reply was couched. But mere courtesy, valuable as it is
at all times, never so valuable as at this, is not enough at this critical
moment. 'Sweet words butter no parsnips' is a proverb more applicable to-day
than ever before. Behind the courtesy there was the determination to punish
Turkey. Punishment of Turkey is a thing which Muslim sentiment cannot tolerate
for a moment. Muslim soldiers are as responsible for the result of the war as
any others. It was to appease them that Mr. Asquith said when Turkey decided to
join the Central Powers that the British Government had no designs on Turkey
and that His Majesty's Government would never think of punishing the Sultan for
the misdeeds of the Turkish Committee. Examined by that standard the Viceregal
reply is not only disappointing but it is a fall from truth and justice.
What is this British Empire? It
is as much Mahomedan and Hindu as it is Christian. Its religious neutrality is
not a virtue, or if it is, it is a virtue of necessity. Such a mighty Empire
could not be held together on any other terms. British ministers are therefore
bound to protect Mahomedan interests as any other. Indeed as the Muslim
rejoinder says, they are bound to make the cause their own. What is the use of
His Excellency having presented the Muslim claim before the Conference? If the
cause is lost the Mahomedans will be entitled to think that Britain did not do
her duty by them. And the Viceregal reply confirms the view. When His
Excellency says that Turkey must suffer for her having joined the Central
Powers he but expresses the opinion of British ministers. We hope, therefore,
with the framers of the Muslim rejoinder that His Majesty's ministers will mend
the mistakes if any have been committed and secure a settlement that would
satisfy Mahomedan sentiment.
What does the sentiment demand?
The preservation of the Khilafat with such guarantee as may be necessary for
the protection of the interests of the non-Muslim races living under Turkish
rule and the Khalif's control over Arabia and the Holy Places with such
arrangement as may be required for guaranteeing Arab self-rule, should the
Arabs desire it. It is hardly possible to state the claim more fairly than has
been done. It is a claim backed by justice, by the declarations of British
ministers and by the unanimous Hindu and Muslim opinion. It would be midsummer
madness to reject or whittle down a claim so backed.
"As I told you in my last
letter I think Mr. Gandhi has made a serious mistake in the Kailafat business.
The Indian Mahomedans base their demand on the assertion that their religion
requires the Turkish rule over Arabia: but when they have against them in this
matter, the Arabs themselves, it is impossible to regard the theory of the
Indian Mahomedans as essential to Islam. After all if the Arabs do not
represent Islam, who does? It is as if the German Roman Catholics made a demand
in the name of Roman Catholicism with Rome and the Italians making a contrary
demand. But even if the religion of the Indian Mahomedans did require that
Turkish rule should be imposed upon the Arabs against their will, one could
not, now-a-days, recognise as a really religious demand, one which required the
continued oppression of one people by another. When an assurance was given at
the beginning of the war to the Indian Mahomedans that the Mahomedan religion
would be respected, that could never have meant that a temporal sovereignty
which violated the principles of self-determination would be upheld. We could
not now stand by and see the Turks re-conquer the Arabs (for the Arabs would
certainly fight against them) without grossly betraying the Arabs to whom we
have given pledges. It is not true that the Arab hostility to the Turks was due
simply to European suggestion. No doubt, during the war we availed ourselves of
the Arab hostility to the Turks to get another ally, but the hostility had
existed long before the war. The Non-Turkish Mahomedan subjects of the Sultan
in general wanted to get rid of his rule. It is the Indian Mahomedans who have
no experience of that rule who want to impose it on others. As a matter of fact
the idea of any restoration of Turkish rule in Syria or Arabia, seems so remote
from all possibilities that to discuss it seems like discussing a restoration
of the Holy Roman Empire. I cannot conceive what series of events could bring
it about. The Indian Mahomedans certainly could not march into Arabia
themselves and conquer the Arabs for the Sultan. And no amount of agitation and
trouble in India would ever induce England to put back Turkish rule in Arabia.
In this matter it is not English Imperialism which the Indian Mahomedans are up
against, but the mass of English Liberal and Humanitarian opinion, the mass of
the better opinion of England, which wants self-determination to go forward in
India. Supposing the Indian Mahomedans could stir up an agitation so violent in
India as to sever the connection between India and the British Crown, still
they would not be any nearer to their purpose. For to-day they do have
considerable influence on British world-policy. Even if in this matter of the
Turkish question their influence has not been sufficient to turn the scale
against the very heavy weights on the other side, it has weighed in the scale.
But apart from the British connection, Indian Mahomedans would have no
influence at all outside India. They would not count for more in world politics
than the Mahomedans of China. I think it is likely (apart from the pressure of
America on the other side. I should say certain) that the influence of the
Indian Mahomedans may at any rate avail to keep the Sultan in Constantinople.
But I doubt whether they will gain any advantage by doing so. For a Turkey cut
down to the Turkish parts of Asia-Minor, Constantinople would be a very
inconvenient capital. I think its inconvenience would more than outweigh the
sentimental gratification of keeping up a phantom of the old Ottoman Empire.
But if the Indian Mahomedans want the Sultan to retain his place in
Constantinople I think the assurances given officially by the Viceroy in India
now binds us to insist on his remaining there and I think he will remain there
in spite of America."
This is an extract, from the
letter of an Englishman enjoying a position in Great Britain, to a friend in
India. It is a typical letter, sober, honest, to the point and put in such
graceful language that whilst it challenges you, it commands your respect by
its very gracefulness. But it is just this attitude based upon insufficient or
false information which has ruined many a cause in the British Isles. The
superficiality, the one-sidedness the inaccuracy and often even dishonesty that
have crept into modern journalism, continuously mislead honest men who want to
see nothing but justice done. Then there are always interested groups whose
business it is to serve their ends by means of faul or food. And the honest
Englishman wishing to vote for justice but swayed by conflicting opinions and
dominated by distorted versions, often ends by becoming an instrument of
injustice.
The writer of the letter quoted
above has built up convincing argument on imaginary data. He has successfully
shown that the Mahomedan case, as it has been presented to him, is a rotten
case. In India, where it is not quite easy to distort facts about the Khilafat,
English friends admit the utter justice of the Indian-Mahomedan claim. But they
plead helplessness and tell us that the Government of India and Mr. Montagu
have done all it was humanly possible for them to do. And if now the judgment
goes against Islam, Indian Mahomedans should resign themselves to it. This
extraordinary state of things would not be possible except under this modern
rush and preoccupations of all responsible people.
Let us for a moment examine the
case as it has been imagined by the writer. He suggests that Indian Mahomedans
want Turkish rule in Arabia in spite of the opposition of the Arabs themselves,
and that, if the Arabs do not want Turkish rule, the writer argues, no false
religions sentiment can be permitted to interfere with self-determination of
the Arabs when India herself has been pleading for that very status. Now the fact
is that the Mahomedans, as is known to everybody who has at all studied the
case, have never asked for Turkish rule in Arabia in opposition to the Arabs.
On the contrary, they have said that they have no intention of resisting
Arabian self-government. All they ask for is Turkish suzerainty over Arabia
which would guarantee complete self-rule for the Arabs. They want Khalif's
control of the Holy Places of Islam. In other words they ask for nothing more
than what was guaranteed by Mr. Lloyd George and on the strength of which
guarantee Mahomedan soldiers split their blood on behalf of the Allied Powers.
All the elaborate argument therefore and the cogent reasoning of the above
extract fall to pieces based as they are upon a case that has never existed. I
have thrown myself heart and soul into this question because British pledges
abstract justice, and religious sentiment coincide. I can conceive the
possibility of a blind and fanatical religious sentiment existing in opposition
to pure justice. I should then resist the former and fight for the latter. Nor
would I insist upon pledges given dishonestly to support an unjust cause as has
happened with England in the case of the secret treaties. Resistance there
becomes not only lawful but obligatory on the part of a nation that prides
itself on its righteousness.
It is unnecessary for me to
examine the position imagined by the English friend, viz., how India would have
fared had she been an independent power. It is unnecessary because Indian
Mahomedans, and for that matter India, are fighting for a cause that is
admittedly just; a cause in aid of which they are invoking the whole-hearted
support of the British people. I would however venture to suggest that this is
a cause in which mere sympathy will not suffice. It is a cause which demands
support that is strong enough to bring about substantial justice.
I have been overwhelmed with
public criticism and private advice and even anonymous letters telling me
exactly what I should do. Some are impatient that I do not advise immediate and
extensive non-co-operation; others tell me what harm I am doing the country by
throwing it knowingly in a tempest of violence on either side. It is difficult
for me to deal with the whole of the criticism, but I would summarize some of
the objections and endeavour to answer them to the best of my ability. These
are in addition to those I have already answered:--
(1) Turkish claim is immoral or
unjust and how can I, a lover of truth and justice, support it? (2) Even if the
claim be just in theory, the Turk is hopelessly incapable, weak and cruel. He
does not deserve any assistance.
(3) Even if Turkey deserves all
that is claimed for her, why should I land India in an international struggle?
(4) It is no part of the Indian
Mahomedans' business to meddle in this affair. If they cherish any political
ambition, they have tried, they have failed and they should now sit still. If
it is a religious matter with them, it cannot appeal to the Hindu reason in the
manner it is put and in any case Hindus ought not to identify themselves with
Mahomedans in their religious quarrel with Christendom.
(5) In no case should I advocate
non-co-operation which in its extreme sense is nothing but a rebellion, no
matter how peaceful it may be.
(6) Moreover, my experience of
last year must show me that it is beyond the capacity of any single human being
to control the forces of violence that are lying dormant in the land.
(7) Non-co-operation is futile
because people will never respond in right earnest, and reaction that might
afterwards set in will be worse than the state of hopefulness we are now in.
(8) Non-co-operation will bring
about cessation of all other activities, even working of the Reforms, thus set
back the clock of progress. (9) However pure my motives may be, those of the
Mussalmans are obviously revengeful.
I shall now answer the objections
in the order in which they are stated--
(1) In my opinion the Turkish
claim is not only not immoral and unjust, but it is highly equitable, if only
because Turkey wants to retain what is her own. And the Mahomedan manifesto has
definitely declared that whatever guarantees may be necessary to be taken for
the protection of non-Muslim and non-Turkish races, should be taken so as to
give the Christians theirs and the Arabs their self-government under the
Turkish suzerainty.
(2) I do not believe the Turk to
be weak, incapable or cruel. He is certainly disorganised and probably without
good generalship. He has been obliged to fight against heavy odds. The argument
of weakness, incapacity and cruelty one often hears quoted in connection with
those from whom power is sought to be taken away. About the alleged massacres a
proper commission has been asked for, but never granted. And in any case
security can be taken against oppression.
(3) I have already stated that if
I were not interested in the Indian Mahomedans, I would not interest myself in
the welfare of the Turks any more than I am in that of the Austrians or the
Poles. But I am bound as an Indian to share the sufferings and trial of
fellow-Indians. If I deem the Mahomedan to be my brother. It is my duty to help
him in his hour of peril to the best of my ability, if his cause commends
itself to me as just.
(4) The fourth refers to the
extent Hindus should join hands with the Mahomedans. It is therefore a matter
of feeling and opinion. It is expedient to suffer for my Mahomedan brother to
the utmost in a just cause and I should therefore travel with him along the
whole road so long as the means employed by him are as honourable as his end. I
cannot regulate the Mahomedan feeling. I must accept his statement that the
Khilafat is with him a religious question in the sense that it binds him to
reach the goal even at the cost of his own life.
(5) I do not consider
non-co-operation to be a rebellion, because it is free from violence. In a
larger sense all opposition to a Government measure is a rebellion. In that
sense, rebellion in a just cause is a duty, the extent of opposition being
determined by the measure of the injustice done and felt.
(6) My experience of last year
shows me that in spite of aberrations in some parts of India, the country was
entirely under control that the influence of Satyagraha was profoundly for its
good and that where violence did break out there were local causes that
directly contributed to it. At the same time I admit that even the violence
that did take place on the part of the people and the spirit of lawlessness
that was undoubtedly shown in some parts should have remained under check. I
have made ample acknowledgment of the miscalculation I then made. But all the
painful experience that I then gained did not any way shake my belief in
Satyagraha or in the possibility of that matchless force being utilised in
India. Ample provision is being made this time to avoid the mistakes of the
past. But I must refuse to be deterred from a clear course; because it may be
attended by violence totally unintended and in spite of extraordinary efforts
that are being made to prevent it. At the same time I must make my position
clear. Nothing can possibly prevent a Satyagrahi from doing his duty because of
the frown of the authorities. I would risk, if necessary, a million lives so
long as they are voluntary sufferers and are innocent, spotless victims. It is
the mistakes of the people that matter in a Satyagraha campaign. Mistakes, even
insanity must be expected from the strong and the powerful, and the moment of
victory has come when there is no retort to the mad fury of the powerful, but a
voluntary, dignified and quiet submission but not submission to the will of the
authority that has put itself in the wrong. The secret of success lies
therefore in holding every English life and the life of every officer serving
the Government as sacred as those of our own dear ones. All the wonderful
experience I have gained now during nearly 40 years of conscious existence, has
convinced me that there is no gift so precious as that of life. I make bold to
say that the moment the Englishmen feel that although they are in India in a
hopeless minority, their lives are protected against harm not because of the
matchless weapons of destruction which are at their disposal, but because
Indians refuse to take the lives even of those whom they may consider to be
utterly in the wrong that moment will see a transformation in the English
nature in its relation to India and that moment will also be the moment when
all the destructive cutlery that is to be had in India will begin to rust. I
know that this is a far-off vision. That cannot matter to me. It is enough for
me to see the light and to act up to it, and it is more than enough when I gain
companions in the onward march. I have claimed in private conversations with
English friends that it is because of my incessant preaching of the gospel of
non-violence and my having successfully demonstrated its practical utility that
so far the forces of violence, which are undoubtedly in existence in connection
with the Khilafat movement, have remained under complete control.
(7) From a religious standpoint
the seventh objection is hardly worth considering. If people do not respond to
the movement of non-co-operation, it would be a pity, but that can be no reason
for a reformer not to try. It would be to me a demonstration that the present
position of hopefulness is not dependent on any inward strength or knowledge,
but it is hope born of ignorance and superstition.
(8) If non-co-operation is taken
up in earnest, it must bring about a cessation of all other activities
including the Reforms, but I decline to draw therefore the corollary that it
will set back the clock of progress. On the contrary, I consider
non-co-operation to be such a powerful and pure instrument, that if it is
enforced in an earnest spirit, it will be like seeking first the Kingdom of God
and everything else following as a matter of course. People will have then
realised their true power. They would have learnt the value of discipline,
self-control, joint action, non-violence, organisation and everything else that
goes to make a nation great and good, and not merely great.
(9) I do not know that I have a
right to arrogate greater purity for myself than for our Mussalman brethren.
But I do admit that they do not believe in my doctrine of non-violence to the
full extent. For them it is a weapon of the weak, an expedient. They consider
non-co-operation without violence to be the only thing open to them in the war
of direct action. I know that if some of them could offer successful violence,
they would do to-day. But they are convinced that humanly speaking it is an
impossibility. For them, therefore, non-co-operation is a matter not merely of
duty but also of revenge. Whereas I take up non-co-operation against the
Government as I have actually taken it up in practice against members of my own
family. I entertain very high regard for the British constitution, I have not
only no enmity against Englishmen but I regard much in English character as
worthy of my emulation. I count many as my friends. It is against my religion
to regard any one as an enemy. I entertain similar sentiments with respect to
Mahomedans. I find their cause to be just and pure. Although therefore their
viewpoint is different from mine I do not hesitate to associate with them and
invite them to give my method a trial, for, I believe that the use of a pure
weapon even from a mistaken motive does not fail to produce some good, even as
the telling of truth if only because for the time being it is the best policy,
is at least so much to the good.